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The key result of the so-called “New Trade Theory” is that countries gain from
falling trade costs by an increase in the number of varieties available to consumers.
Though the number of varieties in a given country rises, it is also true that global va-
riety decreases from increased competition wherein imported varieties drive out some
local varieties. This second result is a major issue for anti-trade activists who criticize
the move towards free trade as promoting “homogenization” or “Americanization” of
varieties across countries. We present a model of endogenous entry with heterogeneous
ﬁrms which models this concern in two ways: a portion of a consumer’s income is
spent overseas (i.e. tourism) and an existence value (a common tool in environmental
economics where simply knowing that a species exists provides utility). Since lowering
trade costs induces additional varieties to export and drives out some non-exported
varieties, these modiﬁcations result in welfare losses not accounted for in the existing
literature. Nevertheless, it is only through the existence value that welfare can fall
as a result of declining trade barriers. Thus, for these criticisms of globalization to
dominate, it must be that this loss in the existence value outweighs the direct beneﬁts
from consumption.
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11 Introduction
Among the many criticisms of globalization is the concern that foreign produced varieties
drive out local ones. The interplay between trade and variety has been a focus for interna-
tional trade researchers since Krugman (1979). This work highlights the fact that although
the number of varieties across the world fall with trade as imported varieties drive out local
ones, welfare rises as average costs fall and the number of varieties within a country - includ-
ing locally-made and imported varieties - increases. Recent advances with ﬁrm heterogeneity
(e.g. Melitz, 2003) reinforce these ideas with a selection eﬀect whereby high productivity
exporting ﬁrms drive out low productivity non-exporters. Nevertheless, these arguments
miss a fundamental aspect of the concern over globalization and variety, namely that anti-
globalization activists are as concerned with the overseas variety as with the varieties at
home. This critique laments that when an agent travels overseas, the presence of exported
varieties from home lessens the foreignness of the other country. For example, a McDon-
ald’s in Beijing signals the loss of a local, non-exported Chinese culinary experience. Thus,
tourism oﬀers one avenue by which domestic agents care about overseas variety. Alterna-
tively, critics argue that, even in the absence of direct consumption of foreign non-exported
varieties, there is value to simply knowing of their existence (what we will refer to as the
“existence value”).1 This paper builds on the existing literature by incorporating these two
features into a Melitz-style model of endogenous entry and monopolistic competition. We
demonstrate that, even when there is a preference for foreign varieties over exported domes-
tic varieties, that welfare from consumption and income increases as trade costs fall. This
is countered by a decline in the existence value. Thus, unless one is willing to attach a
suﬃciently high beneﬁt to the existence value relative to the beneﬁts arising from domestic
consumption, this potential downside of globalization is overridden by its beneﬁts.
In setting up our model, we intentionally do so in a way that gives this criticism the
greatest beneﬁt of the doubt. In particular, our preference structure for overseas consumption
1“Existence value” is sometimes referred to as “passive use value”.
2modiﬁes the basic Dixit-Stiglitz setup in which all varieties are equally valued. Instead, we
assume that, for equal quantities, the utility a home consumer in the foreign country derives
from a foreign, non-exported variety is greater than or equal to that from a foreign, exported
variety. This in turn is greater than or equal to the utility derived from a home-produced,
exported variety. To make the comparisons more concrete, consider an American in Ireland.
Whereas the standard Dixit-Stiglitz preferences would have the consumer view a pint of
Budweiser (an American variety exported to Ireland) the same as a pint of Guinness (an
Irish variety available in America) or a pint of Porterhouse (an Irish variety only available in
Ireland), we allow for the possibility that the consumer strictly prefers drinking Porterhouse
to Guinness due to its “foreignness” and likewise that a Guinness is preferable to Budweiser.
Thus, all else equal, if an American variety drives out an Irish variety, this is a net utility
loss, a loss that is especially acute if that Irish variety is only available while in Ireland.
Thus, if there is an increase in globalization, modeled as a fall in trade costs, this would tend
to imply a welfare loss as additional American varieties, such as Miller, drive out indigenous,
hard to ﬁnd Irish microbrews such as Galway Hooker.2
In addition to tourism, we introduce an existence value, that is, a beneﬁt that arises
simply from knowing that a variety exists even if it is never used or consumed. The use
of existence values in environmental economics dates back to Krutilla (1967).3 In that
literature, they appeal to the notion that species, forests, or other natural resources provide
beneﬁt simply from knowing that they are out there. Here, one could attribute such utility
to travel shows or the like, i.e. even though an agent will never travel to a given country and
consume their non-exported products, the agent enjoys the notion that they are out there.4
Thus, as is well known from the New Trade Theory, when trade costs fall and the number
of varieties available in the world as a whole falls, this would result in a welfare decrease.
2May such a thing never come to pass.
3Horowitz, McConnell, and Murphy (2008) provide a recent overview of existence values in environmental
economics.
4If one doubts the possibility of such existence values, one need look no further than the multitude of
travel journalists, including the incomparable Rick Steves.
3Despite these changes, however, we ﬁnd that welfare will tend to rise as trade costs fall.
A fall in trade costs results in three things from the perspective of a home consumer. First,
there is an increase in imports to home from foreign (i.e. more Guinness in America). This
eﬀect increases welfare and has been well documented elsewhere. Second, and something
not found in the literature, there is an increase in exports from home to foreign (i.e. more
Budweiser in Ireland) which results in an ambiguous welfare eﬀect. This ambiguity arises
because, although highly-prized non-exported foreign varieties are driven from the market
causing a welfare loss, the lower cost of domestic exports somewhat oﬀsets this. While
the net eﬀect is ambiguous it does give some credence to the concerns of anti-globalization
activists. Nevertheless, the combined impact of the home and foreign market changes is
unambiguously positive, that is, the beneﬁts to domestic consumption outweigh any potential
losses from overseas consumption. Finally, there is a third eﬀect on the existence value. Since
increased trade reduces the number of varieties across the globe, this represents an welfare
loss. However, for increased globalization to lower welfare, it must be the case that this
indirect loss outweighs the welfare gains from direct consumption (which obviously cannot
happen if there is no existence value). Thus, even when stacking the deck in favor of the
anti-trade contingent, our model suggests that this particular concern over globalization may
well be superseded by other, ﬁrst-order eﬀects.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model and its
equilibrium, illustrating the role of tourism and the existence value. Section 3 analyzes the
change in welfare arising from a fall in trade costs. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model builds oﬀ of the well-known Melitz (2003) model. There are two countries, Home
and Foreign. We will refer to the home country as the domestic country to ease discussion.
Foreign variables will be labeled with ∗s. Home (Foreign) is exogenously endowed with ¯ 𝐿
4(¯ 𝐿∗) units of labor which is the sole factor of production. Without loss of generality, let
¯ 𝐿 ≥ ¯ 𝐿∗. There are two sectors. Sector 1 is the numeraire and consists of a homogeneous
good (?) that is produced under constant returns to scale, freely traded, and sold in a
perfectly competitive market. Sector 2 consists of a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods, each
variety of which is indexed by 𝑖. As is standard in the Melitz model, this is produced under
increasing returns to scale in a monopolistically competitive market with free entry. Unlike
sector 1, this market faces trade barriers. With the exception of the potential diﬀering labor
endowments countries are identical. Therefore, analyzing the situation for Home informs us
of the analogous situation for Foreign and we will refer to the foreign country only when
necessary.
2.1 Sector 1
The price of ? is normalized to 1. Assuming that one unit of labor is needed for production,
this normalizes the wage in each country to unity. Finally, we assume that in equilibrium a
positive amount of ? is produced and consumed in each country.
2.2 Consumers
Let the utility function for a representative agent in home take the following form
𝑈 = 𝜇1 ln(𝑋1) + 𝜇2 ln(𝑋2) + Φ(𝑎?,𝑎
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𝜇1 > 0, 𝜇2 ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ ? ≤ ? ≤ ?,
5and 𝜀 = 1/(1 − 𝜌) is the elasticity of substitution. Thus preferences admit a quasi-linear
form that is linear in the numeraire and non-linear in domestic consumption (𝑋1), overseas
consumption through tourism (𝑋2), and the existence value (Φ(.), which is increasing in
the cutoﬀs for domestic and foreign entry, two terms discussed momentarily). The set of
varieties are deﬁned as follows. Ω1 is the set of varieties available to a home-based consumer
for consumption in the home country. This set comprised of domestically produced varieties
and imported foreign varieties. Using the analogy from the introduction, Ω1 would include
Budweiser (an exported American variety), Rogue (a non-exported American variety), and
Guinness (an exported Irish variety). This is standard in the new trade theory. Ω2 is the set
of varieties available for consumption in Foreign that originate in Home (i.e. Budweiser).5
Ω3 is the set of varieties available for consumption in both Home and Foreign that originate
in Foreign (i.e. Guinness). Ω4 is the set of varieties available for consumption only in Foreign
(i.e. Porterhouse). These varieties are obviously made in Foreign. Note that by assuming
that ? ≥ ? ≥ ?, we are allowing both for the possibility that a home consumer treats all
varieties available in Foreign equally and for a possibility in which she prefers Foreign-made
varieties while in in Foreign. Note that one could alternatively assume that a Home consumer
in Foreign prefers Home-made varieties (i.e. that there is “homesickness”).6 However, since
increased availability of Home varieties would then be a beneﬁt for Home consumers overseas,
an argument that runs counter to the critique of globalization we address, we do not admit
this possibility here in order to make the strongest possible case against trade liberalization.
5Note that Ω2 = Ω∗
3, i.e. Budweiser to an American in Ireland is comparable to Budweiser to an Irishman
in America. Similarly, Ω3 = Ω∗
2.
6Alternatively, one can consider a setting where Home products are safer or more reliable than Foreign
made varieties, in which case both Home and Foreign consumers would place a higher value on Home varieties
in both locations. Although this is an interesting avenue of thought, it breaks the symmetry of our model
and we leave it to future research.


















1−𝜀 → Porterhouse (7)
































4(𝑖) ∀𝑖 ∈ Ω1 − Ω2
?1(𝑖) + ?∗
3(𝑖) ∀𝑖 ∈ Ω2
, (10)
and aggregate Foreign demand for variety 𝑖 produced and sold by a home country ﬁrm (i.e.
this ﬁrms export demand) is
𝑄𝑋(𝑖) = ?
∗
1(𝑖) + ?2(𝑖) ∀𝑖 ∈ Ω2. (11)
7Note that the price index for Home’s consumption in Foreign is not the same as the price index for
Foreign’s consumption in Foreign. These are diﬀerent because while a Foreign consumer weights each variety
she consumes in Foreign the same, the Home tourist weighs certain varieties consumed in Foreign diﬀerently.
72.3 Heterogeneous Firms
A ﬁrm must pay a ﬁxed cost 𝑓? (measured in units of labor) in order to enter the industry.
If this cost is paid, the ﬁrm then draws a constant output-per-unit-labor coeﬃcient 1/𝑎 from
the Pareto distribution 𝐺(𝑎).8 Once this coeﬃcient is observed, a ﬁrm decides to exit and
not produce or remain. If it chooses to remain, it must then decide whether to serve only
the domestic market or additionally the foreign market. By serving the domestic market the
ﬁrm must incur an additional ﬁxed cost 𝑓?. If it chooses to export to the foreign market,
it must pay 𝑓𝑋 > 𝑓?. Production exhibits constant returns to scale with labor as the only
factor of production.
The decision to become a ﬁrm and which market to service depends on the associated
proﬁt for each type. Recall that the numeraire yields wages equal to one in both countries,
























Note that a ﬁrm does not realize it can aﬀect ??1, or ??∗
2. Thus, a ﬁrm selling domestically
will charge a price equal to a constant markup over marginal cost, 𝑝(𝑖) =
𝑎𝑖
𝜌 . Therefore, the
operating proﬁt function for a purely domestic ﬁrm is
𝜋?(𝑖) = 𝑎
1−𝜀






















, 0 < 𝑎 < 𝑎𝑈.
We follow Helpman et al. (2004) and Chor (2009) and assume the 𝜎 > 𝜀 − 1.
8Firms that want to become an exporter pay an additional ﬁxed cost 𝑓𝑋 and face sym-
metric trade costs in the form of melting-iceberg transport cost 𝜏 > 1.9 Moveover their
demand at home is diﬀerent because the demand from foreign tourist changes, i.e. once
Guinness is available in America, this changes how an American in Ireland views the beer.


































Note that since 𝑓𝑋 > 𝑓?, any exporting ﬁrm will also ﬁnd it proﬁtable to sell domestically.
This is the purpose of including ﬁrm heterogeneity in the model. Without it, it would be
possible for some ﬁrms based in Home to sell only in Foreign, clouding the interpretation
of changes in the mass of varieties across the world as new exporters crowd out domestic
varieties. Further, it ensures that lost varieties are precisely those small overseas producers
whose product is available only in their local market, bringing our analysis as close as possible
to the argument of the anti-globalization critics.
2.4 Equilibrium
In terms of ﬁrm activity, we have three equilibrium conditions. First, a ﬁrm will produce
domestically if there exists nonnegative proﬁts. This yields a cutoﬀ productivity level 𝑎?
which represents the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between supplying the domestic market and exiting.
Noting that since trade costs (𝜏) and expenditures on the heterogeneous good (𝜇1 and 𝜇2)
are identical across countries we can appeal to symmetry and drop the country indicator (∗)
9A ﬁrm must ship 𝜏 units for one unit to arrive.


















Firms that are more productive than this cutoﬀ will serve the domestic market, which in-
cludes both local consumers and tourists from overseas. Firms that are less productive will
not enter. Note that this implies that the existence value Φ(𝑎?,𝑎∗
?) is implicitly a function
of the total mass of varieties across the planet.
Second, a ﬁrm will become an exporter if the proﬁts from becoming an exporter are at
least as big as the decrease in domestic proﬁts, that results from ? ≤ ?, which means that
the ﬁrm will potentially lose some of its appeal with foreign tourists.10 This results in a
cutoﬀ 𝑎𝑋 for which ﬁrms at least as productive as this will export and those that are less




















Figure 1 uses these ﬁrm cutoﬀs to illustrate the ﬁrm indices/varieties that belong to each
particular set of varieties. It can be seen that a Home consumer, while in Home, consumes all
varieties produced in Home (0 < 𝑎 ≤ 𝑎?) along with the varieties produced in Foreign and
exported to Home (0 < 𝑎∗ ≤ 𝑎∗
𝑋). Similarly, when an agent from Home travels to Foreign
and consumes as a tourist, she consumes varieties that are produced in Home and exported
to Foreign (0 < 𝑎 ≤ 𝑎𝑋), as well as all varieties produced in Foreign. However, we have
allowed for the agent to weight varieties that are available to them at home (0 < 𝑎∗ ≤ 𝑎∗
𝑋)
diﬀerently than those varieties only available in Foreign (𝑎∗
𝑋 < 𝑎 ≤ 𝑎∗
?).
10Note that if 𝗽 > 𝗾, there exists the possibility that a ﬁrm would choose to export at a loss because it
is then a familiar variety to tourists from overseas (i.e. it switches from a 𝗾 to a 𝗽 variety), raising proﬁts
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Figure 1: Home’s Consumption in Equilibrium with Trade
Third, an entrepreneur will take a draw as long as the expectation of proﬁts ¯ 𝜋 is positive.11
This results in a free entry condition given by:12











[𝜎 − 𝜀 + 1]𝑎𝜎
𝑈
= 𝑓? (17)





































where 𝑁? denotes the number (mass) of entrants; i.e. those taking a draw but not necessarily
11For simplicity, we assume the “probability of death” in Melitz (2003) in each period is equal to one,
making our model a one shot version of his.
12Detailed derivations are in Appendix A.



















leaving us with four equations ((14), (15), (17), and (20)) and four unknowns (𝑎?, 𝑎𝑋, ??1,
and ??2).
3 The Welfare Impact of Freer Trade
In order to determine the impact of falling trade costs on welfare, we must derive the com-
parative statics of the above system of equations. Totally diﬀerentiating (14), (15), (17),













































































(𝜎 − 𝜀 + 1)𝜏𝜀 (24)
where
Υ = 1 +
𝑁?𝑁𝑋𝜇1𝜇2








13The number (mass) of domestic and exported varieties are the respectively:












14Detailed derivations are in Appendix B.
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These results are intuitive. As trade barriers fall, ﬁrms that were not interested in
exporting begin doing so, increasing the exporter cutoﬀ 𝑎𝑋. This competition drives some
low productivity ﬁrms from the market, lowering 𝑎?. The net eﬀect of this is to increase
the price index for domestic consumption ??1. These results match those found elsewhere.
In our model, we additionally have the impact of falling trade barriers on the overseas
consumption (through tourism) price index ??2. This change is ambiguous because although
the falling trade barriers tend to increase ??2, one must consider changes in the mix of varieties
overseas. First, the increase in home exports drives out some foreign non-traded varieties.
Since foreign non-trade varieties are less valued than home-made varieties, this tends to
lower ??2. In addition, this is reinforced by the increase in exported foreign-made varieties,
moving some foreign varieties from the treasured Ω4 set to the less valued Ω3 set. This is
illustrated in Figure 2; as trade barriers lower, the varieties in the sets Ω2 and Ω3 increase,
while the varieties belonging to Ω4 diminish as this set is eroded from both sides. Which
eﬀect dominates depends on parameter values and most obviously on the ranking of ?, ?,
and ?. If we assume that ? = ? = ?, this second eﬀect disappears and, as with domestic
consumption, ??2 strictly rises as trade barriers fall.
Since 𝑎? falls with the decline in trade barriers, the mass of varieties available across the
planet will fall. Nevertheless, as has been highlighted elsewhere, this does not necessarily
mean that the mass of varieties in a given location declines. This depends on whether or not
new exporters oﬀsets the decline in domestic varieties. Deﬁning the total mass of varieties
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and the mass of varieties falls along with trade barriers. Note that this does not imply lower
welfare since this loss must be weighed against lower prices resulting from lower costs.
Recalling that since by free entry average proﬁts are zero, the indirect utility function
for the representative consumer is:
𝑉𝑘 = 𝜇1 ln(𝑋1) + 𝜇2 ln(𝑋2) + Φ(𝑎?,𝑎
∗
?) + 𝐿𝑘 − 𝜇1 − 𝜇2 (28)



































































































𝜎[? + (? − ?)𝜏1−𝜀 − ?]
(𝜎 − 𝜀 + 1)
)
> 0.
Thus, the sum of the ﬁrst two terms in (29) is positive. This means that, ignoring changes
in the existence value, welfare is decreasing in trade costs. Thus, as trade becomes freer,
welfare improves. This is because the losses associated with the decrease in highly valued
non-tradable foreign varieties (both through exit and switching to exported varieties) are
more than overcome by the gains associated with cheaper exports (be they foreign varieties
in home or home varieties in foreign). The existence value eﬀect, however, is unambiguously
negative. Therefore, the net impact on welfare of a decline in trade costs is ambiguous.
However, for it to be negative as the anti-globalization activists claim, it must be the case that
the welfare eﬀect of the decline in the existence value is greater than the gains from actual
consumption. Thus, although theoretically possible, this would require some potentially
extreme assumptions on parameter values. Finally, note that by symmetry, this also implies
when ignoring existence value changes a decline in trade costs results in a welfare gain to
the world.
4 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to seriously consider the possibility that because typical
trade models do not adequately consider the value consumers place on overseas varieties,
an oversight that could overstate the beneﬁts resulting from trade liberalization. We show
15that, when building a model that favors the view of anti-globalization critics, there is some
ground by which to argue that the presence of domestic varieties overseas lowers welfare. This
obtains from two factors. First, it is possible that the fall in trade costs can lower the welfare
from overseas consumption. However, any potential negative eﬀect is more than oﬀset by a
rise in welfare from domestic consumption, resulting in an unambiguous consumption-driving
welfare gain. Second, the existence value from simply knowing that varieties are in the world
unambiguously falls. Nevertheless, for the net eﬀect on welfare to be negative, it must be
that this existence value dominates the welfare gains arising from the actual consumption of
overseas varieties.
This should not be taken to mean that there are no losses from liberalization. First,
since the existence value falls, one can argue that the welfare gains of lowered trade costs are
overstated, even if the net eﬀect is still a welfare increase. Second, this is but one avenue by
which trade could impact welfare. There exists a plethora of models by which allowing freer
trade can lead to lower equilibrium welfare.15 Therefore, while it is not our contention that
there is no scope for lower trade costs to lower equilibrium welfare, our results do suggest
that it may be necessary to consider alternative channels in order to argue against lowering
trade barriers.
15See, for example, Rauch and Trindade (2009) and Disdier, Head, and Mayer (2010) which both look at
the eﬀect of globalization on cultural diversity.
16APPENDIX
A Free Entry
The free entry condition implies that expected proﬁts ¯ 𝜋 must be zero. Thus the free entry
condition is














, 0 < 𝑎 < 𝑎𝑈 (A-2)
𝑉 (𝑎) =
𝜎






1−𝜀, 0 < 𝑎 < 𝑎𝑈 (A-3)



























































































































[𝜎 − 𝜀 + 1]𝑎𝜎
𝑈
= 𝑓? (B-5)
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(𝜎 − 𝜀 + 1)𝜏𝜀
}
18where








































































Υ ≡ Υ1 + Υ3 − 1
It follows that
∂𝑁𝐸
∂𝜏 = 0. Further, note that
∂𝑃
∂𝜏

















































































(𝜎 − 𝜀 + 1)𝜏𝜀 (B-9)
where
Υ = 1 +
𝑁?𝑁𝑋𝜇1𝜇2








This inequality follows because we assume 𝜎 > 𝜀 − 1, an assumption and result also made
by Helpman et al. (2004), and ? ≤ ? ≤ ?.
19C Welfare
The indirect utility function for the representative consumer is
𝑉𝑘 = 𝜇1 ln(𝑋1) + 𝜇2 ln(𝑋2) + Φ(𝑎?,𝑎
∗
?) + 𝐼 − 𝜇1 − 𝜇2 (C-1)
with 𝐼 = 𝐿𝑘 + 𝑁?¯ 𝜋? + 𝑁𝑋¯ 𝜋𝑋, where ¯ 𝜋 is average proﬁt, but average proﬁt is zero. Diﬀer-




























































































































































𝜎[? + (? − ?)𝜏1−𝜀 − ?]




From here, to arrive at (30), simply reintroduce the change in the existence value.
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